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11 Introduction
The empirical evidence that links the structure of a nation's political institutions
and the distribution of the preferences of the actors that inhabit them to economic
outcomes such as an improved policy environment, investment behavior and economic
growth has grown dramatically in recent years. However, due to data limitations virtually
all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades. The relatively
small number of years available for analysis presents serious limitations for the
interpretation of the results of these studies. Specifically, it is often difficult to separate
the effect of unobserved country characteristics which may be correlated with or cause
cross-national variation in political institutions from the effect of the institutions
themselves.
While some progress has been made in addressing this concern using generalized
method of moment estimators (Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996), this article adopts a
second path. It extends the empirical framework backward in time and performs a more
than century-long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a
panel of over one hundred countries. The results demonstrate that political environments
that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of cross-national
variation in investment in vital economic infrastructure (the number of telephone
handsets and megawatts of electrical generation)1 not only in recent years but also at the
inception of these technologies in the nineteenth century. The effect of cross-national and
                                  
1 While main telephone lines and megawatts of generating capacity would be preferable variables,
they are unavailable prior to the middle of the twentieth century.
2intertemporal variation in political institutions is shown to be independent of unobserved
country-level and/or temporal variation as well as country-specific economic conditions.
Adopting an historical approach offers sufficient time series duration to separately
identify this effect at the cost of sacrificing the richness of data available in studies that
examine more recent, shorter and/or less diverse samples. However, in conjunction with
related work that finds similar effects within more limited samples of countries, regions,
industries and time periods (Mansfield, 1994; Campos and Nugent, 1998; Markusen,
1998; Dawson, 1999; Rose-Ackerman and Rodden, 1999), this article provides additional
evidence that the ability of a nation to credibly commit to a given policy environment is
an important component in explaining investment levels within that country.
These results have important ramifications for the expected diffusion rates of both
the vital components of an economy’s infrastructure examined here as well as the
diffusion of more recent innovations including digital communications networks.
Regardless of the relevant socioeconomic, demographic or policy related factors that may
be thought to lead to rapid diffusion of these or other new technologies, countries lacking
a credible policy regime will be at an extreme disadvantage when competing against
other countries for infrastructure investment. From the perspective of the investor,
analysis of the opportunity posed by a given country for private infrastructure investment
that neglects a sophisticated analysis of the institutional environment will more likely
result in an opportunity for the government to expropriate the investor that an opportunity
for that investor to earn a fair return on their investment.
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2.1 Infrastructure Stock and Returns to Capital
Although the main emphasis of this paper is on the manner in which political
institutions affect the level of investment in telecommunications and electrical
infrastructure in a given country, the analysis of political factors must also take into
account the initial level of infrastructure stock already in place in that country. The
current analysis thus shares with the macroeconomic growth literature (rooted in the
models of Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965)) the insight that a country’s existing level
of capital stock—or in this case, infrastructure penetration, determines the level of
marginal returns available from additional capital deployment and thereby influences the
growth rate of the stock—or in this case, infrastructure penetration (see Barro (1992)).
Counterintuitively for sectors commonly viewed as having "network"
characteristics, diminishing marginal returns to capital are likely to be observed in panel
data on infrastructure investment such as employed in this study. Within a single country
over time, investment is likely to take place first in the highest return geographical areas
(urban population centers) and then slowly spread to the remainder of the country. At a
moment in time across a sample of countries, those countries at the frontier of
infrastructure penetration must experiment with new technologies and invest not just in
deployment of infrastructure but also in the development of new mechanisms for
infrastructure supply and new products that may lead to additional demand. Laggard
                                  
2 For an expanded discussion of the link between political institutions and investment in
infrastructure see (H nisz and Zelner, 1999) and (Zelner and Henisz, 1999).
4countries may, to some extent "free-ride" on the investment and experience of the
countries that have preceded them.
 The link between the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital and
the proposition of an inverse relationship between infrastructure stock and infrastructure
growth is the concept of transitional disequilibrium: countries cannot instantaneously
attain their desired infrastructure stock levels given changes to the political or economic
environment. Therefore, when these environmental conditions change over time or vary
across countries, countries further ahead on the diffusion curve will experience less rapid
growth than "laggard" countries.
Another prominent technological driver of cross-national variation in
infrastructure investment is the effect of the passage of time. Infrastructure growth rates,
like patterns of growth and diffusion of many other products and technologies (Romeo,
1975; Benvignati, 1982; Gort and Klepper, 1982; Oster, 1982; Quirmbach, 1986; Levin,
Levin and Meisel, 1987; Rose and Joskow, 1990; Pennings and Harianto, 1992;
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994, likely display an
age dependence. Examining patterns of historical diffusion (see Figures 1 and 2) one
observes relatively low to moderate growth rates in the initial decades after the initial
penetration of infrastructure services followed -- in some countries -- by a rapid
acceleration of growth and -- in a handful of countries -- a downward trend in penetration
beginning in just the past few years. While some of this pattern may correspond to
variation over time in the environmental variables described below, the similarity to
patterns of diffusion of other technologies points to a role for technology as well.
Specifically, it may take some time after the availability of new infrastructure prior to
5widescale adoption and reorganization of economic organization to take advantage of the
ubiquitous supply of these producers (David, 1989). Later, growth rates may stabilize or
even become negative as demand is saturated, more efficient consumption is realized
and/or alternative products (e.g., cellular handsets) arrive in the marketplace.
2.2 Political Institutions and Investment
The relationship between the stock of a country's infrastructure and the growth
rate of that infrastructure will be conditional on a set of country characteristics. Chief
among these will be the country's ability to provide a credible policy environment for
investors. Theoretical support for the economic impact of political institutions has
expanded dramatically in the quarter century since (North and Thomas, 1973) first
outlined a "transaction cost view of economic history." The crucial economic role played
by socio-political factors which reduce the costs of bargaining, contracting, monitoring
and enforcement has achieved the status of conventional wisdom in economic history
(North and Weingast, 1989; Root, 1989; North, 1990; De Long and Shleifer, 1993;
Mokyr, 1993; Landes, 1998) and development (Nelson, 1989; Nelson, 1990; North, 1990;
Bates and Krueger, 1993; Campos and Lien, 1994; Brunetti and Weder, 1995; Haggard
and Kaufman, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Sachs and Werner, 1995; World Bank,
1995; Olson, 1996; World Bank, 1996; World Bank, 1997). Scholars in both these
domains agree that a government s abili y to credibly commit not to interfere with
private property rights is instrumental in obtaining the long term capital investments
required for countries to experience rapid economic growth.
While these arguments are most transparent and likely strongest when considering
private investors, so long as public sector managers with control over investment also
6engage in subgoal pursuit, in particular, the maximization of discretionary income
streams, it is still reasonable to expect that the institutional environment will affect the
incentives that managers of public sector organizations face to deploy capital. Like
private sector managers, public sector managers face mechanisms that limit the extent to
which they can pursue their subgoals at the expense of their political and financial
principals. However, these mechanisms are relatively weak and leave public sector
managers with substantial latitude to pursue subgoals. Specifically, both oversight
(monitoring) and incentive-based measures that are operative in the private sector are less
binding on public sector managers (Cameron and Duignan, 1984; Vining and Boardman,
1989; Scott, Bushnell and Sallee, 1990).
Because of the long time horizon, economies of scale and scope and highly
political nature of the investment, investment in infrastructure will be especially sensitive
to a country’s institutional environment (Williamson, 1976; Levy and Spiller, 1994;
Spiller and Vogelsang, 1996; Savedoff and Spiller, 1997; Bergara Duque, Henisz and
Spiller, 1998; Caballero and Hammour, 1998). Empirical work that has, to date, primarily
adopted a case study approach provides strong support for this hypothesis (Grandy, 1989;
Daniels and Trebilcock, 1994; Crain and Oakley, 1995; Levy and Spiller, 1996 ;
Ramamurti, 1996; Savedoff and Spiller, 1997; Dailami and Leipziger, 1998) including
two examples delving into economic history by examining the construction of the
Spanish (Keefer, 1996) and New Jersey (Grandy, 1989) railways. Two recent efforts to
extend this logic to panel datasets in telecommunications (Henisz a d Zelner, 1999) and
electricity (Zelner and Henisz, 1999) have also found strong support for the hypothesis
that political institutions that fail to constrain arbitrary behavior by political actors
7dampen the incentive for infrastructure providers to deploy capital and, ceteris paribus,
yield lower levels of per capita infrastructure investment.3
2.3 Economic Characteristics
In addition to the political forces described above, economic conditions are also
likely to play an important role in the pattern of infrastructure investment across countries
and over time. Data limitations of the century-long panel prohibit the inclusion of
variables such as the composition of production of the economy, the cost of construction
and the demographic characteristics of the population. However, some of these factors
may be captured by examining cross-national variation in the level of income and in the
rate of economic growth and allowing the effect of these variables on infrastructure
growth to vary by country.
3 Measurement and Data
3.1 Political Constraints
The measure of political constraints employed in this paper estimates the
feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one
actor may lead to a change in government policy) using the following methodology. First,
extracting data from political science databases, it identifies the number of independent
                                  
3 In the case of electricity, the positive effect of political constraints on infrastructure investment is
shown to be operative only in the presence of substantial political competition from industrial users of
electricity (Zelner and Henisz, 1999).
8branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers)4 with veto
power over policy change in up to 160 countries in every year from 1800 to the present.
The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy are then assumed to
be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space.
This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional
hazards using a simple spatial model of political interaction.
This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment
across branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and
legislative branches. Such alignment increases the feasibility of policy change. The
measure is then further modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within
each legislative branch which increases (decreases) decision costs of overturning policy
for aligned (opposed) executive branches. Detailed information on the construction of
this variable along with a pair of sample derivations and mean values for each country for
each decade are provided in Appendix 1.
3.2 Other Independent Variables
Data on infrastructure and other non-political factors that may be thought to
influence infrastructure investment including real per capita income income, population
levels, geographic area and macroeconomic aggregates are taken from Mitchell (1992;
                                  
4 Previous derivations of the political constraint index described here have included an
independent judiciary and sub-federal political entities for a total of five potential veto points. Data
limitations preclude their inclusion here. The effect of their omission will be to diminish the variance
among countries with relatively high levels of political constraints thereby dampening the magnitude of the
observed effect.
91993; 1995) and updated using The World Development Indicators, 1998 (World Bank,
1998).
4 Initial Investment
What are the determinants of the timing of a country's initial investment in
infrastructure? Once the technology to transmit voice messages had been demonstrated
by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 or to centrally generate electric power for
transmission by Thomas Edison in 1882, many countries quickly followed the United
States and adopted these technologies. However, outside of the United States and a core
set of European countries, adoption times lagged into the decades and infrastructure
growth rates after adoption are noticeably slower. While the level of economic
development and the relationship between a country and the core set of industrialized
nations clearly play a role, the theoretical arguments developed above also point to an
important relationship between political constraints and time to adoption.
4.1 Specification
In order to test this hypothesis, a discrete time logit model is employed to
examine the determinants of the transition from having no infrastructure investment to
having some positive quantity.
Let H(t) equal the probability of adoption for a country at time t. According to our
hypotheses there exist a set of country-level independent variables (w) that determine
H(t).
H(t) = (w(t)
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So as to insure that H(t) (the probability of adoption) is bounded by 0 and 1 in the
empirical results, one commonly takes a logistic transformation:
Log(H(t)/1-H(t)) = (w(t)
Next, a separate observation record is created for every unit of time. Thus, if a
country does not have its first telephone handset until 1883, that country has a record in
each year after 1877 (the year after adoption by the United States) with a dependent
variable equal to zero (no adoption) in each year until 1883 whereafter the dependent
variable equals one (adoption). The full sample (including multiple observations for the
same entry) is then estimated using a using a maximum likelihood estimator for the
traditional logit specification. This technique addresses both the problems of censoring
and time-varying explanatory variables.
Of the 6901 observed country-years with zero infrastructure penetration in
telecommunications and the 5754 in electricity, less than three hundred cases possess
data on the macroeconomic conditions. Unfortunately, this limited sample precludes
independent testing of economic and political effects in this analysis. The independent
variables included in the vector w(t) are therefore limited to:
(YEAR - YR_INIT_INFx) Year since the initial adoption by any country of
infrastructure of type x where x0 [telephone
headsets, megawatts of electricity generated];5
COLONY Dummy variable if country was a colony in year t;6
                                  
5 Nonlinearities in the effect of the time trend on infrastructure growth rates were explored
including the potential for a dependence on the level of political constraints but one can not reject the
hypothesis of a linear effect. Examination of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that few countries have stabilized their
infrastructure growth rates and only a handful have experienced negative growth.
6 The effect of various colonial heritages (British, French, Belgian, Spanish, Dutch, German,
Chinese, American, Japanese and other) was explored but one was unable to reject the null hypotheses that
the effects of colonial origin were insignificantly different from zero.
11
POLCON Political Constraint Index described in S ction 3.1
and in Appendix 1;
REGDUM A vector of regional dummies.
4.2 Results
Table 1 displays the estimation results. With the exception of the regional
dummies for Latin America & the Caribbean in the full telecommunications
specification, all variables are individually significant at a p-value of .01 or less.
Additionally, an F-test confirms that the regional dummies as a group are jointly
significant at a p-value of 0.01. The inclusion of the political constraint index offers a
substantial improvement upon the specification in which regional dummy variables, a
time trend and colonial status enter alone.7 In the case of telecommunications, the full
model correctly predicts 93.4 per cent of non-adopting years and 93.6 per cent of
adopting years or an 85.7 per cent improvement over a constant probability assumption.
Similarly, in the case of electricity, the full model correctly predicts 89.1 per cent of non-
adopting years and 92.5 per cent of adopting years for and 78.3 per cent improvement
over a constant probability assumption.
Table 2 displays the actual and predicted (both with and without the political
constraint index) year of adoption of telecommunications and electrical generation
infrastructure for each country in the sample. The improvement in the latter case is
marked. Specifically, the average error in the predicted year of initial adoption declines
                                  
7 The F-statistics of 1039 in the case of telecommunications and 456 in the case of electricity and
log-likelihood ratios of 335.3 and 183.3 respectively reject the null hypothesis of the redundancy of the
political constraint index with a p-value of less than 0.0001.
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from 16.3 years to 13.1 years in the case of telecommunications and from 9.2 to 7.6 years
in the case of electricity.
Ceteris Paribus, ten years after the initial adoption by any country, an African
country that is not a colony with political constraints one standard deviation above the
mean is more than four times as likely (2.7 vs. 0.8 per cent) to engage in their initial
investment in telecommunications infrastructure and almost twice as likely (9.7 vs. 5.0
per cent) to undertake their initial investment in electrical generating capacity than a
country with political constraints at the mean. The magnitude of this effect declines
moderately over time to approximately three hundred per cent (15.9 vs. 5.2 per cent) and
fifty per cent (43.7 vs. 25.8 per cent) twenty-five years after the initial adoption by any
country. While other unobserved country characteristics that are correlated with political
constraints may be driving these results, this initial test at least lends preliminary support
to the notion that the credibility of a government's policymaking apparatus plays an
important role in the diffusion process of infrastructure.
5 Subsequent Investment
In order to attempt to take this alternate hypothesis into account, this section
exploits post-adoption variation in the data to examine the determinants of cross-national
and intertemporal variation in infrastructure growth rates. The unbalanced panel data sets
contain up to 129 countries for as many as 119 years.
5.1 Specification
The econometric specification employed is:
13
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where subscripts i and t are cross-sectional (country) and time period indices, the notation
) signifies a percentage change and ln sig ifies the natural logarithm. Variable definitions
follow from Section 4 with the addition of:8
INFPC = Per capita infrastructure of type xwhere x0 [telephone
headsets, megawatts of electricity generated].
RGNPPC = Real per capita income expressed in 1990 U.S. dollars.
TIMEDUMS = Annual time dummies.
5.2 Estimation
I pool across time periods and countries with the exception of (1) the constant
term, which is pooled across time periods only; (2) the growth in real GNP measure,
which is also pooled across time periods only; and (3) the annual time period dummies,
which are necessarily pooled across countries only.
Two econometric issues arise in estimating this equation. First, because the
sample is a panel consisting of repeated observations on a broad cross-section of
countries, the error term exhibits within-group serial correlation. I model the
autocorrelation process as AR(1) and estimate the resulting transformed equation using
nonlinear least squares.9 The advantage of using this procedure rather than more
                                  
8 Once again, potential nonlinearities in the effect of income and infrastructure stock including the
potential for nonlinearities that are dependent on the level of political constraints were explored but one can
not reject the null assumption of a linear relationship in each case.
9 Using Eviews 3.1.
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traditional two-stage procedures such as Cochrane-Orcutt or Prais-Winsten is that, in
addition to being asymptotically efficient, the nonlinear estimator is also robust to the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the RHS.10
Second, the sample exhibits groupwise heteroskedasticity. I correct for
heteroskedasticity by applying weights to the data. These weights are inversely related to
the within-group variance of the NLS residuals. I also report heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors (White, 1980).11
5.3 Results
Table 3 reports the estimation results. With the exception of the dummy for
colonies and some of the time and country-specific GDP growth coefficients, each
variable is correctly signed and individually significant at a p-value of 0.01 or less.
Additionally, F-tests confirm that the time- and country-specific GDP growth regressors
are both, as a group, jointly significant at a p-value of 0.01 or less. The Durbin-Watson
statistic ranges from 1.86 to 2.10 across the various specifications indicating that the
                                  
10 See (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993): 331-332 & 151-152) and (Fair, 1984).
11 Future drafts will attempt alternate estimation techniques including the use of five-year panels to
smooth out relatively "noisy" annual data as well as the use of a robust covariance matrix estimator based
on that developed by Newey and West (Newey and West, 1987; Greene, 1997:503-506). This covariance
matrix estimator is consistent in the presence of within-unit serial correlation up to a specified lag and
heteroskedasticity of unknown form. Compared with the alternative procedure of estimating one or more
AR(n) terms, the use of the robust covariance matrix estimator has several advantages. First, it is
computationally simpler. Not only does it easily accommodate autocorrelation that is of higher order than
one, but it also simplifies estimation of models that are nonlinear in the parameters. The latter feature is
especially advantageous in the current context because two of the three models used are nonlinear. Second,
the robust covariance matrix estimator does not rely on an assumption that the different cross-sectional
units share common autocorrelation parameters. Failure to make this assumption in the estimation of AR(n)
models creates a need to estimate many additional parameters, which reduces the efficiency of the point
estimator. Third, it is not necessary to drop observations from one or more time periods when using the
robust covariance matrix estimator. The estimator differs from the original Newey-West version in that it is
constructed for use in a panel setting rather than a conventional time-series setting (see Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) and Froot (1989)).
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inclusion of the AR(1) term mitigates the effects of autocorrelation. The adjusted R2
figure is, in each case, above 0.998.
The magnitude of the economic effect of the political constraint index is moderate
in size. A one standard deviation in the political constraint index (0.25) leads to a
predicted increase in infrastructure penetration growth of 0.2 percentage points in the
case of telecommunications and 0.4 percentage points in the case of electricity. Recall
that these are annual growth rates excluding time period specific, country specific effects
and the effects of income levels and growth rates with the latter estimated separately for
each country. Previous research has demonstrated that political constraints are likely an
important determinant of economic growth and, therefore, over the century-long period
under examination here, income levels. The magnitude of the direct economic effect
computed here should therefore be considered a lower bound on the total economic effect
of political constraints on infrastructure growth. Nevertheless, an increase in 0.2 (or 0.4)
per cent per annum, through compounding would yield a difference in levels of 3.9 (or
7.8) per cent after 20 years and 10.3 (or 20.6) per cent after fifty years.
6 Conclusion
By demonstrating that a sophisticated incorporation of the institutional
environment improves the power of models that predict both the initial year of
infrastructure adoption by a country and the subsequent rate of growth of that
infrastructure, this paper attempt to address the critiques that unobserved country-level
heterogeneity may be driving much of the reported correlation between the structure of a
nation's political institutions and a broad set of economic outcomes. Since initial adoption
decisions can not, by definition, be influenced by the existing level of infrastructure
16
stock, concerns regarding the role of initial conditions combined with path dependency in
explaining observed outcomes are somewhat alleviated by the adoption results reported
here. Similarly, the reported results showing a statistically and economically significant
link between political institutions and infrastructure growth rates even in a specification
that includes country- and time-specific effects as well as country-specific slopes with
respect to income growth, should alleviate concerns regarding unobserved country-level
heterogeneity.
Of course, these results are unable to account for a host of alternate economic
explanations that may play an important role. However, in conjunction with other studies
that study a shorter time period and are therefore able to control for these effects, the
evidence arguing for a sophisticated treatment of political institutions in the study of
cross-national variation in economic outcomes appears increasingly strong.
Policymakers seeking to attract investment in vital infrastructure sectors should
pay careful attention to the structure of the political institutions in their country and, if
necessary, design mechanisms to compensate for institutional shortcomings.
Analogously, investors should analyze not just the demand for new infrastructure but also
the credibility of any and all explicit and implicit government pledges necessary to
receive a fair rate of return on the investment in that infrastructure.
17
Core Europe
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
18
83
18
87
18
91
18
95
18
99
19
03
19
07
19
11
19
15
19
19
19
23
19
27
19
31
19
35
19
39
19
43
19
47
19
51
19
55
19
59
19
63
19
67
19
71
19
75
19
79
19
83
19
87
19
91
19
95
T
e
le
p
h
o
n
e
s 
p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
U.K. Netherlands Belgium France Switzerland Germany West Germany
Austria Italy Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
European Settled Countries
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
18
76
18
80
18
84
18
88
18
92
18
96
19
00
19
04
19
08
19
12
19
16
19
20
19
24
19
28
19
32
19
36
19
40
19
44
19
48
19
52
19
56
19
60
19
64
19
68
19
72
19
76
19
80
19
84
19
88
19
92
T
e
le
p
h
o
n
e
s 
p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
U.S.A. Canada South Africa Israel Australia New Zealand
Peripheral Europe
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
19
00
19
03
19
06
19
09
19
12
19
15
19
18
19
21
19
24
19
27
19
30
19
33
19
36
19
39
19
42
19
45
19
48
19
51
19
54
19
57
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
T
e
le
p
h
o
n
e
s 
p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
Poland Hungary Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia Bulgaria
Romania Russia Ireland Spain Portugal
East Germany Greece Cyprus Turkey
Asia
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
18
92
18
96
19
00
19
04
19
08
19
12
19
16
19
20
19
24
19
28
19
32
19
36
19
40
19
44
19
48
19
52
19
56
19
60
19
64
19
68
19
72
19
76
19
80
19
84
19
88
19
92
T
e
le
p
h
o
n
e
s 
p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
Afghanistan China Mongolia Taiwan South Korea Japan India
Bhutan Pakistan Bangladesh Myanamar Sri Lanka Nepal Thailand
Laos Vietnam Malaysia Singapore Philippines Indonesia
Figure 1: Diffusion of Telecommunications Infrastructure
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Table 1: Estimation Results for Initial Investment in Infrastructure
Variable Telecommunications Electricity
C -2.66
(0.00)
-4.50
(0.00)
-2.10
(0.00)
-3.06
(0.00)
POLCON 5.59
(0.00)
3.21
(0.00)
COLONY -1.60
(0.00)
-1.30
(0.00)
-0.95
(0.00)
-0.77
(0.00)
Time Trend 0.11
(0.00)
0.12
(0.00)
0.12
(0.00)
0.12
(0.00)
European
Settled
-0.65
(0.00)
-0.77
(0.00)
-1.30
(0.00)
-1.41
(0.00)
Eastern
Europe
-2.26
(0.00)
-1.79
(0.00)
-3.03
(0.00)
-2.32
(0.00)
Latin
America
-0.61
(0.00)
0.36
(0.09)
-2.24
(0.00)
-1.72
(0.00)
South
America
-1.11
(0.00)
-0.05
(0.00)
-2.98
(0.00)
-2.15
(0.00)
Middle East -5.16
(0.00)
-4.46
(0.00)
-4.10
(0.00)
-3.39
(0.00)
Asia -4.11
(0.00)
-3.47
(0.00)
-3.52
(0.00)
-2.91
(0.00)
Africa -4.36
(0.00)
-3.83
(0.00)
-3.29
(0.00)
-2.65
(0.00)
N 15250 13859 13624 12552
Log
Likelihood
-3212 -2322 -3316 -2820
McFadden
R-squared
0.69 0.76 0.64 0.67
Per cent
Dep = 1
54.7% 54.8% 57.8% 59.3%
Correctly
Predicted
91.5% 93.5% 90.4% 91.2%
Per cent
Gain
81.3% 85.7% 77.3% 78.3%
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Table 2: Actual and Predicted Years of Initial Investment in Infrastructure
Both Omitting (1) and Including (2) the Index of Political Constraints
Telecommunication Electricity
Country Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Afghanistan 1951 1949 1951 1951 1948 1949
Algeria 1946 1963 1961 1946 1956 1955
Angola 1947 1956 1956 1929 1949 1949
Argentina 1913 1907 1913 1927 1933 1927
Australia 1901 1908 1901 1919 1925 1922
Austria 1884 1902 1884 1920 1914 1918
Bangladesh 1972 1954 1953 1951 1951 1952
Belgium 1896 1902 1898 1920 1914 1909
Benin 1959 1956 1956 1949 1949 1949
Bhutan 1972 1939 1972 1973 1943 1973
Bolivia 1913 1907 1899 1937 1933 1928
Botswana 1963 1956 1956 1966 1949 1949
Brazil 1907 1907 1907 1928 1933 1935
Bulgaria 1902 1923 1902 1924 1939 1940
Burkina Faso 1959 1956 1956 1947 1949 1949
Burma 1951 1948 1951 1951 1948 1951
Burundi 1963 1956 1956 1965 1949 1949
Cambodia 1950 1949 1949
Cameroon 1950 1956 1956 1950 1949 1949
Canada 1904 1908 1906 1919 1925 1922
Central African Republic 1959 1956 1956 1954 1949 1949
Chad 1959 1956 1956 1953 1949 1949
Chile 1900 1907 1900 1923 1933 1923
China, PR 1949 1939 1943 1941 1943 1945
Colombia 1913 1907 1913 1933 1933 1928
Congo 1959 1956 1956 1957 1949 1949
Costa Rica 1913 1912 1913 1950 1939 1931
Cote d'Ivoire 1950 1956 1956 1950 1949 1949
Cuba 1913 1912 1915 1928 1939 1939
Cyprus 1936 1922 1931 1948 1932 1939
Czechoslovakia 1920 1923 1925 1919 1939 1919
Denmark 1900 1902 1901 1920 1914 1911
Dominican Rep. 1913 1912 1915 1936 1939 1928
East Germany 1949 1923 1929 1946 1939 1940
Ecuador 1903 1907 1903 1948 1933 1935
Egypt 1911 1949 1951 1950 1948 1949
El Salvador 1905 1912 1905 1950 1939 1939
Ethiopia 1951 1942 1946 1950 1942 1943
Finland 1920 1916 1917 1923 1918 1917
France 1889 1902 1894 1901 1914 1909
Gabon 1952 1956 1956 1952 1949 1949
Germany 1888 1902 1910 1900 1914 1919
Ghana 1931 1956 1956 1948 1949 1949
Greece 1935 1902 1922 1922 1914 1922
Guatemala 1913 1912 1915 1937 1939 1939
Guinea 1958 1956 1956 1950 1949 1949
Guyana 1913 1922 1922 1951 1940 1942
Haiti 1928 1912 1925 1950 1939 1950
Honduras 1906 1912 1915 1950 1939 1931
Hungary 1901 1923 1929 1923 1939 1940
India 1921 1948 1948 1939 1948 1948
Indonesia 1948 1945 1945 1928 1945 1945
Iran 1952 1949 1952 1954 1948 1952
Iraq 1949 1949 1951 1941 1948 1949
Ireland 1924 1916 1922 1929 1922 1922
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Telecommunication Electricity
Country Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Israel 1950 1908 1931 1949 1932 1939
Italy 1883 1902 1883 1895 1914 1912
Jamaica 1922 1927 1925 1937 1947 1945
Japan 1892 1939 1892 1907 1943 1907
Jordan 1955 1949 1955 1956 1948 1949
Kenya 1925 1956 1956 1938 1949 1949
Kuwait 1955 1962 1961 1955 1956 1955
Laos 1955 1950 1950 1951 1950 1950
Lebanon 1951 1949 1951 1943 1948 1949
Liberia 1955 1942 1946 1950 1942 1946
Libya 1953 1951 1951
Madagascar 1947 1956 1956 1931 1949 1949
Malawi 1951 1953 1953 1950 1949 1949
Malaysia 1936 1954 1953 1936 1951 1952
Mali 1960 1956 1956 1949 1949 1949
Mauritania 1959 1956 1956 1963 1949 1949
Mauritius 1951 1956 1956 1946 1949 1949
Mexico 1913 1912 1915 1926 1939 1939
Mongolia 1960 1939 1943 1957 1943 1945
Morocco 1946 1956 1956 1946 1956 1955
Mozambique 1947 1956 1956 1932 1949 1949
Nepal 1961 1939 1943 1953 1943 1945
Netherlands 1900 1902 1896 1919 1914 1908
New Zealand 1890 1908 1890 1926 1925 1922
Nicaragua 1913 1912 1913 1948 1939 1931
Niger 1959 1956 1956 1950 1949 1949
Nigeria 1951 1956 1956 1948 1949 1949
North Yemen 1962 1949 1951 1950 1948 1949
Norway 1900 1906 1905 1920 1914 1910
Oman 1965 1949 1951 1969 1948 1949
Pakistan 1951 1947 1951 1951 1947 1951
Panama 1913 1912 1913 1937 1939 1930
Paraguay 1913 1907 1911 1941 1933 1928
Peru 1913 1907 1913 1931 1933 1935
Philippines 1950 1946 1950 1925 1946 1935
Poland 1921 1923 1922 1923 1939 1923
Portugal 1922 1902 1922 1920 1914 1920
Romania 1900 1923 1900 1923 1939 1940
Russia 1964 1923 1929 1912 1939 1940
Rwanda 1962 1956 1956 1948 1949 1949
Saudi Arabia 1951 1949 1951 1958 1948 1949
Senegal 1959 1956 1956 1950 1949 1949
Sierra Leone 1955 1956 1956 1950 1949 1949
Singapore 1951 1954 1953 1948 1951 1952
Somalia 1968 1956 1956 1954 1949 1949
South Africa 1925 1910 1910 1924 1925 1921
South Yemen 1990 1949 1951 1965 1948 1949
Spain 1902 1902 1914 1901 1914 1922
Sri Lanka 1922 1948 1948 1935 1948 1948
Sudan 1951 1956 1954 1950 1949 1949
Sweden 1885 1902 1885 1901 1914 1910
Switzerland 1900 1902 1882 1920 1914 1903
Syria 1950 1949 1951 1940 1948 1944
Taiwan 1955 1946 1946 1948 1946 1946
Tanzania 1953 1956 1956 1938 1949 1949
Thailand 1920 1939 1936 1934 1943 1936
Togo 1949 1956 1956 1948 1949 1949
Trinidad&Tobago 1934 1927 1925 1933 1947 1945
Tunisia 1947 1957 1957 1946 1956 1955
Turkey 1947 1949 1931 1930 1948 1933
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Telecommunication Electricity
Country Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Uganda 1952 1956 1956 1948 1949 1949
United Kingdom 1894 1902 1894 1896 1914 1910
Uruguay 1900 1907 1900 1909 1933 1909
USA 1876 1908 1887 1902 1925 1919
Venezuela 1912 1907 1911 1938 1933 1935
Vietnam 1950 1954 1953 1950 1951 1952
West Germany 1947 1902 1914 1946 1914 1922
Yugoslavia 1924 1923 1924 1929 1939 1940
Zaire 1947 1956 1956 1930 1949 1949
Zambia 1951 1954 1954 1950 1949 1949
Zimbabwe 1922 1956 1923 1930 1949 1930
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Growth in Infrastructure Stock
Variable Telecommunications Electricity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(INFPCx,i,t) -0.025
(0.000)
-0.024
(0.000)
-0.031
(0.000)
-0.027
(0.000)
-0.055
(0.000)
-0.043
(0.000)
POLCON 0.012
(0.000)
0.004
(0.066)
0.008
(0.000)
0.0166
(0.000)
COLONY -0.002
(0.549)
-0.003
(0.306)
-0.014
(0.000)
-0.011
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.217)
-0.026
(0.000)
Time Trend 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.003
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
(Time Trend)2 -0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Ln(GDPPCt-1) 0.012
(0.000)
0.010
(0.000)
0.010
(0.000)
)RGDPPC t-1 0.040
(0.000)
0.177
(0.000)
p 0.087
(0.000)
0.116
(0.000)
0.263
(0.000)
0.253
(0.000)
0.073
(0.000)
0.083
(0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific Real
GDP growth effects
No No No Yes No No
N 5878 5412 3619 3622 6654 3975
Durbin Watson 1.90 1.93 2.06 2.06 1.91 1.95
Adjusted R-squared0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.998
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Appendix 1: Deriving and Constructing the Political Constraints Index12
Deriving the measure of political constraints
In order to construct a structurally-derived internationally comparable measure of
political constraints, the structure of political systems must be simplified in a manner
which allows for cross-national comparisons over a wide range countries while retaining
the elements of that structure which have a strong bearing on the feasibility of policy
change. Here, I will focus on two such elements: the number of independent veto points
over policy outcomes and the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit them.
Without minimizing their importance, I set aside questions of agenda setting power,
decision costs (Spiller, 1992; Schwartz, Spiller and Urbiztondo, 1994; Spiller and Tiller,
1997) and the relative political authority held by various institutions for subsequent
extensions of the admittedly simplistic modeling framework presented here.
Political actors will be denoted by E (for executive), L1 (for lower house of
legislature), L2 (for upper house of legislature).13 Each political actor has a preference,
denoted by XI where I Î [E, L1, L2]. Assume, for the time being, that the status quo
policy (X0) and the preferences of all actors are independently and identically drawn from
a uniformly distributed unidimensional policy space [0,1]. Data on actual preference
distributions of political actors will subsequently be incorporated into the analysis
loosening this assumption. The utility of political actor I from a policy outcome X is
assumed equal to -|X - XI| and thus ranges from a maximum of 0 (when X = XI) to a
minimum of -1 (when X = 0 and XI = 1 or vice versa). Further assume that each actor has
veto power over final policy decisions. While these are, admittedly, strong assumptions,
the incorporation of more refined and realistic game structures and preference
distributions presents severe complications for analytic tractability. It is hoped that,
mirroring the development of the domestic positive political theory literature, the strength
of the results obtained using the simple framework presented here will provide an
impetus for future research.
The variable of interest to investors in this model is the extent to which a given
political actor14 is constrained in his or her choice of future policies. This variable is
calculated as (1 - the level of political discretion). Discretion is operationalized as the
expected range of policies for which all political actors with veto power can agree upon a
                                  
12 This section draws heavily from (Henisz, 1998).
13 Data limitations of the panel preclude the inclusion of other veto points such as an independent
judiciary, sub-federal units of power, administrative agencies and the like.
14 Without loss of generality, the remainder of the paper refers to changes in executive
preferences. Note that since the preferences of all actors and the status quo policy are drawn identically
from the same distribution, each actor, including the executive, faces the same constraints in changing
policy. Allowance for the likelihood of multiple actors changing preferences simultaneously is made by
incorporating information on alignment of preferences across the various branches of government later in
the analysis.
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change in the status quo. For example, regardless of the status quo policy, an unchecked
executive can always obtain policy XE and is guaranteed their maximum possible utility
of 0. Investors face a high degree of uncertainty since the executive’s preferences may
change or the executive may be replaced by another executive with vastly different
preferences. Therefore this is categorized as a polar case in which political discretion = 1
and political constraints equals 0 (1 - 1).
As the number of actors with independent veto power increases, the level of
political constraints increases. For example, in a country with an effective unicameral
legislature (L1), the executive must obtain the approval of a majority of the legislature in
order to implement policy changes. The Executive is no longer guaranteed the policy XE
as the legislature may veto a change from the status quo policy. The Executive can, at
best, achieve the outcomes closest to XE tha  is preferred by the legislature to the status
quo. Without additional information on the preferences of the Executive and the
legislature it is impossible to compute the exact outcome of the game. Nor is the expected
magnitude of the effect on political discretion of adding this additional veto point
immediately clear. However, one of the virtues of the simple spatial model outlined
above is that it provides a more objective insight into the quantitative significance of
adding an additional veto point.
Given the assumption that preferences are drawn independently and identically
from a uniform distribution, the expected difference between the preferences of any two
actors can be expressed as 1/(n+2)15 where n is the number of actors. Assuming that there
exist two political institutions with veto power (the Executive (E) and a unicameral
legislature (L1)), the initial preference draw yields an expected preference difference
equal to 1/(2 + 2) = 1/4. There are six possible preference orderings in this game (see
Appendix Figure 1) that we will assume are equally likely to occur in practice.16
In ordering (1), no change in executive preferences which retains the initial
ordering of preferences yields a change in policy. The executive (XE = 1/4) prefers all
policies between 1/2 - e and 0 + e to the status quo (X0 = 1/2) while the legislature (XL1 =
3/4) prefers all policies between 1/2 + e and 1 - e to X0. As the executive and the
legislature cannot agree on a change in policy, political discretion (the feasibility of
policy change) equals 0 and political constraints equal 1. The same argument is true by
symmetry for ordering (2). In the remaining orderings, both the executive and legislature
agree on a direction in which policy should move relative to the status quo X0. These
cases have closed form solutions other than the status quo policy. Their exact values
depend on the assumption as to who moves first (or last) and the relative costs of review
by each party.
                                  
15 See Rice (1995:p. 155). The intuition for this result is that the expectation of any single draw is
equal to 1/2 but there exists variation across draws. Given a uniform distribution, the expected distance
between any two adjacent positions declines proportionally to the number of additional draws. The exact
formula is 1/(# of draws + 1).
16 For expositional convenience, I center each of the preference distributions on the unit line. As
long as the expected difference between any two preferred points remains 1/4, the quantitative results are
insensitive to the absolute location of these points. For example, were the leftmost (rightmost) point in each
distribution to be placed at 0 (1) rather than 1/4 (3/4), the quantitative results would be unchanged.
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However, in the absence of knowledge on the rules of the game in each country,
the range of outcomes over which both parties can agree to change the status quo is used
as a measure of political discretion. As this range expands, there exists a larger set of
policy changes preferred by both political actors with veto power. The existence of such a
set reduces the credibility of any given policy and therefore decreases the level of
political constraints. In ordering (3), the executive (XE = 1/2) prefers policies between 1/4
+ e and 3/4 - e to the status quo (X0 = 1/4) while the legislature (XL1 = 3/4) prefers all
policies greater than 1/4 + e. There exists a range of policies approximately equal to 1/2
(between 1/4 + e and 3/4 - e), which both actors agree are superior to the status quo. The
political discretion measure for this ordering therefore equals 1/2 yielding a political
constraints measure equal to 1/2. The same is true in orderings (4), (5) and (6). The
expected level of political constraints for the game {XE , XL1} based on the number of
veto points alone is the average of the political constraint measures across the six possible
preference orderings: (1 + 1 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2)/6 = 2/3.
Note that this initial measure of political constraints is based solely on the number
of de jure veto points in a given polity maintaining the strong and unrealistic assumption
of uniformly distributed preferences. However, neither the Constitutional existence of
veto power nor its prior exercise provide a de facto veto threat in the current period.
Specifically, loosening the assumption of uniformly distributed preferences by allowing
for preference alignment (i.e., majority control of the executive and the legislature by the
same party) would be expected to expand the range of political discretion and thereby
decrease the level of political constraints. In order to allow for this effect, the purely
institutional measure of political constraints described above is supplemented with
information on the preferences of various actors and their possible alignments. For
example, if the legislature were completely aligned with the executive, the game would
revert back to our simple unitary actor discussed above with a constraint measure of 0.
The same exercise of determining constraints given the assumption of either completely
independent or completely aligned actors was conducted for all observed institutional
structures yielding the values for political constraints displayed in Appendix Table 1.
Further modifications are required when other political actors are neither
completely aligned with nor completely independent from the executive. In these cases,
the party composition of the other branches of government are also relevant to the level
of constraints. For example, if the party controlling the executive enjoys a majority in the
legislature, the level of constraints is negatively correlated with the concentration of that
majority. Aligned legislatures with large majorities are less costly to manage and control
than aligned legislatures that are highly polarized.
By contrast, when the executive is faced with an opposition legislature, the level
of constraints is positively correlated with the concentration of the legislative majority. A
heavily fractionalized opposition may provide the executive with more discretion due to
the difficulty in forming a cohesive legislative opposition bloc to any given policy.
Information on the partisan alignment of different government branches and on the
difficulty of forming a majority coalition within them can therefore provide valuable
information as to the extent of political constraints.
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Suppose, for example, that the party controlling the executive completely controls
the other branch(es) of government (100%17 of legislative seats). In this case, the values
displayed in the appropriate right-hand column of Appendix Table 1 are utilized.
However, as the executive’s need for coalition building and maintenance increases (his or
her majority diminishes), and under the assumption that the same party controls both
branches, the values converge to the levels displayed in the left-most column. For the
case in which the branches are controlled by different parties, the results are reversed.
Now, complete concentration by the opposition (100% legislative seats) leads to the
assignment of the values in the left-most column. As the opposition’s difficulty of
forming coalitions increases, the values converge to the levels displayed in the
appropriate right-hand column. Following an extensive body of literature in political
science on the costs of forming and maintaining coalitions, the rate of convergence is
based upon the extent of legislative (or judicial) fractionalization (Rae and Taylor, 1970).
The fractionalization of the legislature (or court) is equal to the probability that
two random draws from the legislature or court are from different parties. The exact
formula is:
]
1-N
N
n 1) - n(
[-1
i
in
=1i
S
where n = the number of parties, ni = seats held by nth party and N = total seats.
The final value of political constraints for cases in which the executive is aligned
with the legislature(s) is thus equal to the value derived under complete alignment plus
the fractionalization index multiplied by the difference between the independent and
completely aligned values calculated above. For cases in which the executives party is in
the minority in the legislature(s), the modified constraint measure equals the value
derived under complete alignment plus (one minus the fractionalization index) multiplied
by the difference between the completely independent and dependent values calculated
above. In cases of mixed alignment, a weighted (equally) sum of the relevant adjustments
is used.
For example, in the case described above the constraint measure equaled 0 if the
legislature was completely aligned and 2/3 if it was completely independent. However, if
the same party controls the executive and the legislative chamber and the probability of
two random draws from the legislature belonging to different parties equals 1/4 (the
executive has a large majority in Parliament) then the modified constraint measure equals
0 + 1/4 * (2/3 - 0) = 1/6. By contrast, if the executive relied on a heavily fractionalized
coalition in which the probability that any two random draws were from different parties
was 75%, the modified constraint measure would equal 0 + 3/4 * (2/3 - 0) = 1/2. In the
case where the opposition controls the legislature the values would be reversed. A heavily
concentrated majority by the opposition would lead to a value of 0 + (1 - 1/4) * (2/3 - 0)
                                  
17 I assume that as the majority diminishes from this absolute level the difficulty in satisfying the
preferences of all coalition or faction members increases thus increasing the level of political constraints.
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= 1/2 while a fractionalized legislature would receive a score of 0 + (1 - 3/4) * (2/3) =
1/6.
 This measure of political constraints has one important virtue that also yields
several weaknesses. The strength of the measure is that it is structurally derived from a
simple spatial model of political interaction which incorporates data on the number of
independent political institutions with veto power in a given polity and data on the
alignment and heterogeneity of the political actors that inhabit those institutions. The first
weakness of the measure is that its validity is based upon the validity of the assumptions
imposed upon the spatial model in order to generate quantitative results. Another
weakness is that many features of interest are left out of the model including agenda
setting rights, decision costs, other relevant procedural issues, the political role of the
military and/or church, cultural/racial tensions, and other informal institutions which
impact economic outcomes.
Constructing the measure of political constraints
Construction of a measure of political constraints based on the above
methodology requires three types of data. First, information regarding the number of
institutional players in a given polity; second, data on partisan alignments (including
coalitions) across institutions; and, finally, data on the party composition of legislatures.
All countries were assumed to have an executive. Data on the existence of other political
actors (unicameral or bicameral legislatures18) with substantive veto power was taken
from the Polity database and Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996).
The above data sources were then supplemented by various issues of The Political
Handbook of the World an The Statesman’s Yearbook to note the party distribution of
the legislature(s): specifically, whether the executive enjoy a majority in one (or both)
legislature(s) and how many seats in each legislature were controlled by each party.
Based on this information, the values of institutional constraints were modified to form a
measure of political constraints using the methodology described in the previous section.
Sample Calculation
Like the hypothetical example above, in 1990 Guyana had two veto points (an
independent executive and a single legislative chamber). However, the same party (the
People's National Congress) controlled the presidency and held 42 of the 53 legislative
seats, with the remaining seats distributed among three other parties. The probability that
two random draws from the legislature would be from different parties (the
fractionalization index) was 35.4 percent. As a result, the initial constraint measure of 2/3
was scaled downwards to 0.237 to take into account the  (imperfect) alignment of the
legislative chamber with the executive branch. (Specifically, the final measure of 0.237 is
                                  
18 Effective legislatures possess “significant governmental autonomy ... including, typically,
substantial authority with regard to taxation and disbursement, and the power to override vetoes of
legislation.” A classification of partially effective is assigned when “the effective executive s power
substantially outweighs but does not completely dominate that of the legislature.” (Gurr, 1990:p. 51)
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35.4% of the distance between the measure with no veto points or perfect alignment
(0.000) and the value of the measure with one veto point and perfect opposition (2/3)).
In 1993, Guyana held an election in which the People’s Progress Party won the
Presidency and the majority in the legislature. The new distribution of seats was 35 for
the People’s Progress and 27 for the People’s National Party, with the remaining parties’
seat totals unchanged. In this case, the probability that two random draws from the
legislature would belong to different parties increased to 54.5 percent, making it
relatively more difficult for the new governing party to steamroll the legislature in
comparison to their immediate predecessor (i.e., their majority was slightly more
tenuous). The political constraint measure thus rose from 0.237 to 0.365 (or 54.5 percent
of the distance between the value with no veto points or perfect alignment and the value
with one veto point and perfect opposition).Appe dix Table 2 reports the decade
average of the result of the analogous calculation for each country where the necessary
data exist.
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Appendix Table 1: Political Constraints with Complete Independence/Alignment
Independent Entities Completely Aligned with Executive
Political Actors None (L1 or L2) L1&L2
E 0
E, (L1 or L2) 2/3 0
E, L1, L2 4/5 2/3 0
Note: E = executive, L1 = lower legislature, L2 = upper legislature
Appendix Figure 1: The Six Possible Preference Ordering of the Game {XE, XL1}
0 1/4  3/4 1 0 1/4  3/4 1
(1)         ___                                           _________________________ (4)
XE X0 XL1 X0 XL1 XE
EEEEEEEEEEE                                               EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
   LLLLLLLLLLL                     LLLLLLLLLLL
0 1/4  3/4 1 0 1/4  3/4 1
(2)                                                                                                           (5)
XL1 X0 XE XE XL1 X0
  EEEEEEEEEE           EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
LLLLLLLLLL                                                LLLLLLLLLLL
0 1/4  3/4 1 0 1/4  3/4 1
(3)                                                                                                            (6)
X0 XE XL1 XL1 XE X0
 EEEEEEEEEEE                                 EEEEEEEEEEE
 LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL          LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL
Note : E indicates the range of outcomes preferred by the executive to the status quo X0
L indicates the range of outcomes preferred by the legislature to the status quo X
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Appendix Table 2 : Decade Averages for Political Constraint Index
COUNTRY 1880-
89
1890-
99
1900-
09
1910-
19
1920-
29
1930-
39
1940-
49
1950-
59
1960-
69
1970-
79
1980-
89
1990-
98
Afghanistan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Algeria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Angola 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
Argentina 0.66 0.48 0.57 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.52
Australia 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.34 0.47 0.59 0.49 0.44 0.55 0.60 0.51 0.50
Austria 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.43 0.20 0.15 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.61 0.66
Bangladesh 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.34
Belgium 0.38 0.37 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.58 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.67 0.69 0.63
Benin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
Bhutan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bolivia 0.29 0.73 0.71 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.56
Botswana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.15 0.24
Brazil 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.18 0.00 0.35 0.62
Bulgaria 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32
Burkina Faso 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Burma 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Burundi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cambodia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Cameroon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24
Canada 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.46 0.65 0.46 0.44 0.56 0.39 0.60 0.41
Central African Rep. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27
Chad 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chile 0.00 0.23 0.69 0.65 0.20 0.00 0.62
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Colombia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.67 0.73 0.26 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.40
Congo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28
Costa Rica 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.32
Cuba 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.32
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35
Czechoslovakia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
Denmark 0.42 0.27 0.39 0.43 0.57 0.69 0.29 0.53 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.47
Dominican Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.52 0.52
Ecuador 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.13
Egypt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
El Salvador 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.27 0.27 0.40
Ethiopia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.48
France 0.26 0.42 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.60
Gabon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
East Germany 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
West Germany 0.05 0.44 0.39 0.49 0.40
Germany 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.56 0.13 0.38
Ghana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00
Greece 0.21 0.26 0.00 0.38 0.26 0.18 0.36 0.34
Guatemala 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.29
Guinea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Guyana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.33 0.25 0.29
Haiti 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Honduras 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.07 0.21 0.31
Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37
India 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.42 0.46 0.59
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Iran 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Iraq 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.58 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.42
Israel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.48
Italy 0.50 0.45 0.33 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.57 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.45
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COUNTRY 1880-
89
1890-
99
1900-
09
1910-
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1920-
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1940-
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69
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79
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1990-
98
Ivory Coast 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Jamaica 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.39 0.37 0.24 0.23
Japan 0.00 0.71 0.71 0.00 0.48 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.50
Jordan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kenya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26
Kuwait 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Laos 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lebanon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.10
Liberia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Libya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Madagascar 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.26
Malawi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17
Malaysia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.38 0.48 0.28
Mali 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24
Mauritania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mauritius 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.43 0.37 0.27
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.33
Mongolia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
Morocco 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.19 0.16
Mozambique 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
Nepal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39
Netherlands 0.41 0.42 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.66 0.66 0.74 0.62 0.68 0.66 0.59
New Zealand 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.32
Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.04 0.00 0.33
Niger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
Nigeria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.00
North Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
North Yemen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway 0.32 0.38 0.37 0.45 0.52 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.46
Oman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pakistan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.50
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.34 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.23
Paraguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17
Peru 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.06
Philippines 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.38 0.52 0.10 0.10 0.55
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.43 0.35
Romania 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42
Russia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Rwanda 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Saudi Arabia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Senegal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Serbia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37
Sierra Leone 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.14 0.06 0.00
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.04
Somalia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.32 0.50 0.41 0.28 0.32 0.20 0.31
South Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.20
South Vietnam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
South Yemen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.46 0.47
Sri Lanka 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.41 0.20 0.36
Sudan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sweden 0.32 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.51 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.44
Switzerland 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.63
Syria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.19 0.31
Tanzania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.53 0.26
Togo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
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Trinidad& Tobago 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.34 0.40 0.47
Tunisia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Turkey 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.55 0.20 0.39 0.38 0.26 0.33
Uganda 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.07
United Kingdom 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.36 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.32
Uruguay 0.73 0.52 0.51 0.68 0.51 0.22 0.21 0.52
USA 0.67 0.58 0.39 0.53 0.43 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.44 0.63 0.70 0.59
Venezuela 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.54
Vietnam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Yugoslavia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Zaire 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zambia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00
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